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Procedure for the Release of the Criminally Insane-
A Suggested Approach*
It is a firmly established principle that one acquited of a criminal
charge by reason of insanity, and committed to a state mental hospi-
tal has the right to be released from confinement when sanity is
restored., However, state statutes governing release procedure are
diverse in their approach, and all lack one or more of the essential
elements of an ideal release statute. The purpose of this note is to
suggest a uniform procedure for the release of the "criminally in-
sane."' 2 It is submitted that there are three elements essential to a
model release statute, and these will be analyzed herein:
1) Mandatory commitment to a state mental hospital of one ac-
quitted of a criminal charge by reason of insanity.
2) A specified minimum period of observation after commitment
as a condition precedent to application for release. If the application
is denied, re-application should be permitted only after a further spec-
ified minimum period has elapsed.
3) An exclusive procedure permitting release only with the ap-
proval and review of the committing court.
Specifically, the ultimate recommendation of this article will be the
Model Penal Code Section 4.08 with slight modification3 Certain of
the statutory provisions in force will be examined and analyzed in
an effort to support the stated recommendations.
I. MANDATORY COMMITMENT TO A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL OF ONE
ACQUITTED OF A CRIMINAL CHARGE BY REASON OF INSANITY
England,4 a minority of American states,5 and the Model Penal
* This note is an expansion of the article, Procedure for the Release of the
"Criminally Insane"--Missouri's Inadequacy, St. Louis B.J., Oct. 1961, p. 11.
1. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sundberg v. District Court of Hennepin County, 185
Minn. 396, 241, N.W. 39 (1932) ; Northfoss v. Welch, 116 Minn. 62, 133 N.W. 82
(1911).
2. This term is not accurate, for one who has been acquitted on the grounds
that he does not understand the nature and consequences of his act is not a
criminal.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
4. Trial of Lunatics Act of 1838, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 14.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4 (Supp. 1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1502
(1953); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 258-39 (Supp. 1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 62-
1532 (1950); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 101 (1956) (only in the case of commit-
ment after acquittal of murder); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 28-933 (3) (1954) (only in
the case of commitment after acquittal of murder); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19(Supp. 1961); NEB. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 29-2203 (1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.445
(1957); N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 454 (Supp. 1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.39 (Baldwin 1958); Wis. STAT. § 957.11(3) (1955).
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Code, provide for the immediate commitment of one acquitted of a
criminal charge by reason of insanity, without inquiry into his pres-
ent mental conditon. There is a split of authority regarding the con-
stitutionality of mandatory commitment statutes, 7 but a majority of
the states which have passed on the question have upheld their
validity8
The mandatory commitment provision is founded on the presump-
tion of continuing insanity. That is, the defendant's insanity when the
act was committed, and introduced at the trial as an excuse for an
otherwise criminal act, is presumed to continue, unless clearly shown
to the contrary by him.9 In a Kansas " case, defendant, on trial for
murder, was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was im-
mediately committed to the insane asylum. Thereafter, he chal-
lenged the mandatory commitment statute, asserting inter alia, that
the presumption of continuing insanity unconstitutionally deprived
him of a jury trial on the question of his sanity at the time of com-
mitment. The court answered his challenge saying:
If the legislature in framing the law sought to give practical effect
to the ordinary presumption [of continuing insanity] referred
to which so well accords with ordinary observation and experi-
ence, no good reason is perceived why it could not do so, leaving
a reasonable opportunity for a future determination of the ques-
tion whether and when the detention should cease.1
Apparently mandatory commitment without further inquiry into
the individual's then existing mental condition is not a denial of due
process so long as ultimate judicial determination of sanity is pro-
vided for by statute. However, the statute is unconstitutional if
subsequent judicial inquiry into the inmate's mental condition is
prohibited. 2 Proponents of the mandatory commitment provision
6. Section 4.08, (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
7. ANNOT., 145 A.L.R. 892 (1943).
8. Ibid.
9. In re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 Pac. 552 (1905).
10. In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492 (1912). In State v. Toon, 172 La.
631, 135 So. 7 (1931), the court said in dicta that one who is successful in estab-
lishing the defense of insanity cannot object to the presumption of continuing
insanity.
11. In re Clark, supra note 10 at 546, 121 Pac. at 495.
12. See, e.g., Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875) (statute held unconstitu-
tional because the mandatory commitment provision excluded the inmate from in-
itiating further investigation and judicial determination of his sanity). Release
from commitment could be achieved only "when prison inspectors summon ...
the circuit judge of the circuit from which he is sent, and the medical super-
intendent of the Kalamazoo insane asylum, who are thereupon to examine into his
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contend that it adds to the public's peace of mind and safety without
unduly abridging the individual's rights." Thus the comments to
the Model Penal Code point out that, "It not only provides the public
with the maximum immediate protection, but may also work to the
advantage of mentally diseased or defective defendants by making the
defense of irresponsibility more acceptable to the public and to the
jury. '14 Finally, mandatory commitment, considered alone, is only a
slight inconvenience to one who successfully established the defense of
insanity, since he would otherwise incur criminal penalties for his
act. Therefore, it is submitted that a mandatory commitment provi-
sion is an essential element of a model release statute.
condition, and if they certify he is not insane, the governor is to discharge him."
Id. at 2. The statute was struck down in the following language:
In the first place the prisoner is sent into confinement without any legal in-
vestigation into his condition at that time, when he may be perfectly sane,
and when, having been acquitted, he is entitled to all the privileges of any
innocent man. There may be a very long interval between the offense and
the trial.
Having been so secluded, he is excluded from the right, and all others are
excluded from the power of resorting to any effectual means, or any means
whatever, of securing a judicial inquiry into his sanity. Neither judge nor
expert has any power under our constitution to select his own means and
process of inquiry, and pass ex parte upon the liberty of citizens. The pro-
ceedings contemplated by this statute are not only inquisitorial and ex parte,
but the officers selected, who are undoubtedly as fit as any one to conduct
such inquiries, have no power to act until the inspectors choose to call them.
It practically leaves the liberty of the person confined to depend upon the
uncontrolled pleasure of the inspectors. A more dangerous scheme, and one
more entirely opposed to the constitutional provision securing to every one
[sic] the protection of due process of law, could hardly be devised. (Id. at 5).
13. S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) (amending the District
of Columbia Code):
[T]he Committee is of the opinion that the public is entitled to know that,
in every case where a person has committed a crime as a result of a mental
disease or defect, such person shall be given a period of hospitalization and
treatment to guard against imminent recurrence of some criminal act by
that person.
The Committee believes that a mandatory commitment statute would add
much to the public's peace of mind, and to the public safety, without impair-
ing the right of the accused. Where accused has pleaded insanity as a de-
fense to a crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact,
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and reasonable in the
Committee's opinion that the insanity, once established, should be presumed
to continue and that the accused should automatically be confined for treat-
ment until it can be shown that he has recovered.
14. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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II. SPECIFIED MINIMUM PERIOD OF OBSERVATION AS A CONDITION
TO APPLICATION OR RE-APPLICATION FOR RELEASE
The requirement of a statutory observation period-s is founded on
the premise that a period of surveillance and examination between
commitment and release is vital to the public interest. Furthermore,
it provides the only basis by which intelligent and rational disposi-
tion can be made of applications for release. Professor Weihofen
comments that:
In the discussion at the 1955 meeting of the American Law Insti-
tute, there was mentioned an Oregon case, in which the state
hospital doctor testified that in his opinion the girl who had killed
her lover had done so because he had jilted her for another, and
that she was not insane. The jury found her insane, and sent her
to the hospital. The doctor stood by his judgment and promptly
released her as sane.' 6
A specified observation period would eliminate this all too frequent
occurrence that Weihofen mentions, whereby one who has success-
fully established the defense of insanity based on the testimony of
private psychiatrists, is released immediately after commitment on
the testimony of the same state psychiatrists who testified that the
defendant was sane at the trial. During this proposed observation
period further examination and evaluation of the patient's mental
condition should be made, and these findings should be considered
along with the testimony presented at the trial in passing on the
release application.
Some jurisdictions 17 prescribe a further minimum period as a condi-
15. See, e.g., In re Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 Pac. '769 (1930). The Supreme
Court in this case justifies this section of the statute by saying that:
Insanity takes so many different forms and its manifestations are so
varied and uncertain that it is often impossible for the most skilled alienist
or astute judge to detect its existence or to predict the time of its recur-
rence, when the patient appears to be for the time free from the affliction.
The restraint and detention imposed is not, as we have seen, for the purpose
of inflicting punishment upon a defendant, but to permit a sufficient length
of time to elapse to enable those who may be called upon to pass upon the
sanity of the patient to intelligently give their judgment as to whether or
not he has recovered his reason. The Legislature has fixed the time as one
year [amended to 90 days]. Perhaps a lesser or greater time would serve the
same purpose but the legislature was in as good a position to judge of the
time required as are the courts. No definite showing has been made that the
time so fixed is an unreasonable time, and, as the matter is one primarily for
the Legislature, we see no reason to overturn their action. Id. at 491, 288
Pac. at 774.
16. WEiHoFEN, THE URGE TO PuNIsH 122-23 (1956).
17. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1026a (Deering 1959) (90 days minimum
confinement-one year must elapse before subsequent application); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1705 (1956) (2 year minimum confinement-5 years must elapse before
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss1/9
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tion to subsequent application for release, after denial of an earlier
application. This prevents the persistent patient from unduly burden-
ing the authorities with unwarranted and unjustified applications.
Also, this period allows for further examination and re-evaluation
of the patient, during which any significant changes will be recog-
nized. The hospital authorities should release a patient when he has
recovered,"' and it is hoped that their decision to release will not be
influenced by public opinion against an unpopular patient.
In order to eliminate the arbitrary and illogical practices examined
above, a model release statute should provide a specified minimum
observation period both upon commitment and prior to re-application
for release where an earlier request has been denied.
III. EXCLUSIVE PROCEDURE PERMITTING RELEASE ONLY WITH THE
APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTING COURT
Varied means of processing applications for release of patients
are in effect throughout the states. The decision to discharge is given
either to the committing court or some other designated court in
slightly more than one-half of the states.19 A few states permit re-
lease without court approval upon the decision of the hospital staff
or an administrative board.2 0 Indeed, in some states release can only
subsequent application); WIs. STAT. § 51.11 (8) (1957) (if first application for
release is unsuccessful, hearing on subsequent application can be compelled only
after one year from any proceeding); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.36 (1946) (6 months
minimum confinement-6 months must elapse before subsequent application);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 27 § 134 (1954) (one year must elapse before subsequent
application); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-16 (1953) (1 year minimum confinement
-1 year must elapse before subsequent application).
18. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DiSORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 384 (1954).
19. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1026 (Deering, 1960); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-4 (Supp. 1957); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-38 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4702 (1953); D. C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1961); HAWAI REV. LAWs § 258-39
(Supp. 1960); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38 § 592 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1705
(1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.31 (Supp. 1960); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.280
(1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28.96 (Supp. 1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 27,
§ 120 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 42 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19
(Supp. 1961); N. J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2:190-17 (Supp. 1951); N. Y. CODE CRiA.
Pnoc. § 454; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Baldwin 1958); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 1301 (1950); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 26, § 3-5 (1956); S. C. CODE
§ 32-932 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953); VT. STAT. § 4808 (1958);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.76.070 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6198 (1955);
Wis. STAT. § 957-11 (1955).
20. Release by the hospital authorities: ARx. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (Supp. 1959)
(the 1959 supplement changed the release authority from the committing court to
the superintendent of the hospital). See Ax. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (1947). It is
now apparently a civil release procedure. See Ax. STAT. ANN. § 59-235 (1947);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.22 (Supp. 1957); GA. CODE § 27-1503 (1953) (Section pro-
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be accomplished by a special act of the legislature or by an order of
the governor.2 1 However, in about one-sixth of the states22 no par-
ticular statutory provision exists providing for the release of patients
committed upon acquittal of a criminal charge. In these states re-
lease is generally accomplished either by writ of habeas corpus or
through procedures available to patients committed under civil com-
mitment proceedings.
Several states have taken the position that control over the dis-
charge of the prisoner should be vested exclusively in the committing
court,23 but this position has been sharply criticized.2 4 Its advocates,
however, believe that the committing court is the agency best fitted
to review release petitions. Their view is that the judiciary's full
vided that criminally insane were to be discharged as all other mental commit-
ments pursuant to § 35-202 (1953) which placed the supervision of release in the
administrative agency of the Board of Control of Eleemosynary Institutions. This
section was repealed by Acts 1960, pp. 837-54 and codified as Chapters 88-16
wherein it is provided that the right of release is vested in the superintendent of
the hospital. The superintendent must, however, notify the court which ordered
the involuntary hospitalization.); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6916 (1952); NEB. RsV.
STAT. § 83-340 (1958); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-10 (1953); N. D. REV. CODE
§ 25-03-15 (Supp. 1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 73 (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.1-239 (Supp. 1960). Release by an administrative agency: IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 66-337 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1950).
21. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 101 (1956). In the case of murder or man-
slaughter only the governor with the advice and consent of the council can dis-
charge the person-section held constitutional and does not deprive person of a
judicial remedy, Robert J. Golden, 341 Mass. 672, 171 N.E.2d 473 (1961). In all
cases other than murder or manslaughter release is vested in the committing court.
See MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 278 § 13 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.933 (1954)
(commitments of those acquitted of murder may be released only on order of the
governor. All other commitments, release is by certification from superintendent
to the court or by habeas corpus. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.967 (1954).) No person
acquitted of a capital felony on ground of mental disorder shall be discharged
unless by act authorizing his discharge by the General Assembly. No person
acquitted of a crime of a lesser degree than a capital felony and committed to the
hospital shall be discharged except by order from the Governor. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 122-86 (1958); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:4 (1955).
22. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee,
Wyoming.
23. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026a (Supp. 1961); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-4 (Supp. 1957); D. C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII, 1960); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1705 (1956); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.280 (1955); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28.96 (Supp. 1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 14 (1957); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1957); N. J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2-190-17 (Supp. 1951);
N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 454 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1301
(1930); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 932b, § 6 (Supp. 1960); VT. STAT.
§ 4808 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6198 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 10.76.070 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 957.11 (1955).
24. Note, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 302 (1958).
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power of review should be exercised to insure uniformity and consist-
ency in decisions and, furthermore, because courts are the agencies
most skilled in resolving conflicting evidence. Moreover, the commit-
ting court possesses the full background and history of the case, and
because of its familiarity with the patient, it is best qualified to
evaluate his present condition. Another reason frequently sug-
gested for placing exclusive release control over a patient in the com-
mitting court is that since the committing court rendered judgment
in the first instance, it should have the opportunity to modify that
judgment in the light of later developments. 21
In states which have no statutory provision for the release of those
previously adjudged criminally insane, the burden of passing on the
application generally falls upon the superintendent of the hospital.
Jurisdiction, when the patient files a writ of habeas corpus demanding
his release, is in the appropriate court in the county where the hospi-
tal is located. For example, in Missouri"° one acquitted of a criminal
charge by reason of insanity is committed to a state hospital if not
fully recovered at the time of the trial. The patient may be released
when his condition warrants it, and this is determined and ordered by
the hospital superintendent.27 This procedure is designed for and made
expressly applicable to persons hospitalized under civil commitments. 2
In addition, a patient unable to convince the superintendent of the
desirability of his release may file a writ of habeas corpus returnable
in the circuit court of the county where the institution is located. 2
Currently, when the procedure applicable to persons civilly committed
is utilized by a party committed as a result of a criminal trial, the
courts are without jurisdiction to interfere 3° The circuit court of the
county where the institution is located has jurisdiction over the
habeas corpus proceedings, and therefore the committing court usually
is without jurisdiction.,3
The results achieved in those states where the director of the
mental institution is given the exclusive right to release demonstrate
25. Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1960).
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.510 (1959).
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.070 (1959).
28. Mo. REv. STAT. § 532.010; § 532.360; § 532.380 (1959).
29. Mo. REv. STAT. § 532.030 (1959).
30. Richey v. Baur, 298 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1957).
31. Obviously Missouri law and that in those other states which lack specific
release procedures for the criminally insane would have to be changed to meet the
recommendations made herein A recent decision of the Missouri Supreme Court,
Richey v. Baur, ibid., has recognized that a release procedure without necessity for
judicial approval may be inadequate in certain situations, and has suggested that
the General Assembly might well be called upon to enact legislation delineating
a specific procedure to be followed when the commitment is of one whose acquittal
was based solely on the grounds of insanity.
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that this procedure is far from ideal. First, hospital staffs-under
constant pressure from overcrowded facilities and lack of person-
nel-might tend to release prematurely3 2 Second, conversely, is the
possibility that psychiatrists, fearful of receiving bad publicity if a
patient should have a relapse, might unjustifiably retain the person,
prolonging confinement in abridgement of his civil liberties.23 Also, it
must be realized that there are many conflicting views and approaches
in psychiatry-so many, in fact, that it led one extremist to state:
"One would have supposed that this muddle in itself would have been
sufficient to make of psychiatry a profession so utterly humble as
practically never to be heard from."' 4 This division of opinion among
psychiatrists, with the proverbial "battle of experts" occurring in
most sanity hearings, requires a jurist to weigh and decide the ulti-
mate facts and make the final evaluation in the light of the purposes
of the law. One view advanced is that an administrative board, com-
posed of psychiatrists, lawyers, civic leaders, clergymen, sociologists,
criminologists and other experts would provide the ideal release au-
thority." This proposal fails to analyze the problem correctly. The is-
sue is primarily factual, seeking proper application of the law, and
having, secondarily, medical and social ramifications. This determi-
nation can be most satisfactorily resolved by minds keyed to a disci-
pline advanced in the art of resolving the conflicting testimony
present in a large majority of the hearings. Law is the discipline
that has been the most successful in the development of that art. For
these reasons and the further significant reason that the committing
court alone is familiar with the case, the committing court should
have exclusive authority to pass upon release petitions.
The exclusivity requirement proposed in this note is more stringent
than that found in effect in jurisdictions which provide for release
procedures to be handled exclusively by the committing court. For
example, the recent controversial District of Columbia statute 6 states
32. Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Adminis-
tration, 53 YALE L.J. 684, 696 (1944); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAS L.Rnv. 307, 333 (1946).
33. Overholzer, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law, 16 B.U.L. REV.
322, 326 (1936).
34. Hakeem, A Critique of Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23
LAW & CONTEAiP. PROB. 650, 659 (1958). For a discussion attempting to highlight
the difficulties in the field of psychiatry due to divergent thought and semantic dis-
crepancies see: Meyer, The Riddle of Legal Insanity, 44 J. CRIM. LAW, C. & P.S.
330 (1953-54).
35. Note, 68 YALE L.J. 292, 303 (1958).
36. D. C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1961). A strong attack is made on the District
statute by Charles W. Halleck in The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia
-A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEO. L.J. 294 (1960-61).
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that one excused from a criminal act by reason of insanity is to be
committed to a mental institution. Thereafter, when the hospital
superintendent is of the opinion that the patient is sane and no longer
dangerous to himself or society, a written certificate stating this
belief is filed in the committing court by the superintendent. The
court may unconditionally discharge the patient if no objection is
raised within fifteen days of the filing of the certificate. However,
the court may, after notice, conduct a hearing and receive evidence
of the patient's condition from the hospital psychiatrists. Moreover,
the United States Attorney or Corporation Counsel for the District of
Columbia may object to the release of a patient, whereupon a hearing
is mandatory. After considering the evidence, the court will uncondi-
tionally- release the patient if their interpretation of the evidence
suggests that the patient has recovered.37 The committing court is
given jurisdiction only in cases where the patient is deemed to be
sane by the superintendent; however, no provision gives the commit-
ting court jurisdiction of cases where the superintendent refused to
certify a patient, or the patient believes he is being illegally re-
strained. The patient may then file a writ of habeas corpus, although
the statute does not provide that it is specifically returnable at the
37. The statute reads, in part:
(d) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense, or
tried in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia for an offense, is ac-
quitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission,
the court shall order such person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally
ill. (e) Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such hos-
pital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in the
opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable future
be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the superin-
tendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional release from the hospital,
and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the person
was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney or the
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office prosecuted
the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the court to order
the unconditional release of the person so confined from further hospitaliza-
tion at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said certificate was filed
and served as above; but the court in its discretion may, or upon objection
of the United States or the District of Columbia shall, after due notice hold
a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condition of the person so con-
fined may be submitted, including the testimony of one or more psychiatrists
from said hospital. The court shall weigh the evidence and, if the court finds
that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable
future be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall order such person
unconditionally released from further confinement in said hospital. If the
court does not so find, the court shall order such person returned to said
hospital.
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committing court.38 This obvious deficiency should be eliminated
by including a provision in the statute specifically providing for
return of the writ at the committing court. This would insure that
the committing court would be the final authority in all instances.
The Minnesota statute resembles the proposals of this note as
closely as any statute in force in the United States29 In Minnesota
the patient may be released from the hospital upon written certifi-
cation of the patient's recovery by the hospital superintendent. Upon
failure or refusal of the superintendent so to certify, the patient
may petition the committing court for release.40
Release, however, has been interpreted to be mandatory by the com-
mitting court if the superintendent presents a certificate, and so in this
respect the court performs a ministerial function.4 1 Based on this
judicial interpretation of the statute, the hospital superintendent
should have been given the sole authority to discharge the patient.
It is clear that this interpretation is not in harmony with the ulti-
mate recommendation of this note. Specifically, the committing court
should exercise its discretion in passing upon a patient who has been
certified by the hospital superintendent. A combination of the District
of Columbia's provision giving the committing court discretion to
order a hearing on the question of the patient's sanity, and the Min-
nesota procedure permitting a patient to petition the committing court
when the superintendent refuses to certify him, plus the added
feature of the Minnesota statute that the statutory relief is exclusive,
constitutes a model release statute. In effect, habeas corpus is not
available to the patient, and this prevents the district or circuit courts
for the county in which the hospital is located from taking jurisdic-
tion-unless, of course, this happens also to be the committing court.
38. However, a state with the statute phrased in the terms of the District statute
not providing for the return of the case to the committing court where the super-
intendent refuses to certify the patient's sanity would have to allow writs of
habeas corpus returnable in the appropriate court of the county in which the
patient is confined, in order not to deny due process. See Northfoss v. Welch, 116
Minn. 62, 133 N.W. 82 (1911).
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1961).
40. If the defendant is found insane at the time of the act and then com-
mitted he may be liberated only upon the order of the court committing him when-
ever the superintendent of the hospital certifies to the court that in his opinion
the defendant is wholly recovered and that no person will be endangered by his
discharge. If the superintendent fails or refuses, a petition may be submitted to
the court and the question decided by the court without regard to the superin-
tendent's opinion. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1961).
41. State ex rel. Sundberg v. District Court of Hennepin County, 185 Minn. 396,
401, 241 N.W. 39, 40-41 (1932). Olsen, J., concurring, felt that it was not manda-
tory upon the committing court to discharge the person upon mere presentation
of the superintendent's certification of sanity, but does not elaborate.
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Thus, exclusivity of authority to release the patient is vested in the
court of original jurisdiction, the committing court.
The Model Penal Code42 seemingly attempted to achieve this result;
however, the section has been construed so as not to deny the right
to habeas corpus. 43
The question then arises: has the patient been denied his consti-
tutional rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by granting exclusive jurisdiction to the committing court, or by
abridging his right to habeas corpus, or both? The leading state case
permitting abridgement of the right to habeas corpus is State ex rel.
Colvin v. Superior Court. 4 The prosecuting attorney of King County,
Washington, sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the superior
court of Walla Walla County from discharging by a writ of habeas
corpus, a party confined in the state penitentiary department for the
criminally insane. The relator alleged that the Washington statute
clothed the committing court with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain
an application for discharge. The statute permitted the patient to ap-
ply to the physician in charge of the hospital for an examination of his
mental fitness. Upon certification of his sanity, the patient could
petition the committing court for release. The issue whether or not a
writ of habeas corpus could legally be denied the petitioner was
energetically argued to the court. Petitioner took the position that
the statutory remedy was concurrent with habeas corpus. This argu-
ment was bottomed on the general rule that one restrained of his
liberty may be released through a habeas corpus proceeding, notwith-
standing a specific statutory remedy. The court held that the statu-
tory remedy was exclusive, based on their understanding of the
legislative intent in enacting the statute. Furthermore, the court
distinguished the general rule relied on by the petitioner, stating that
the statutory remedy is cumulative if the proceeding is administra-
tive, and exclusive if the proceeding is judicial, when the fact to be
ascertained is an individual's sanity.45 The Colvin case cited an earlier
Washington decision4 6 that habeas corpus is unavailable until all statu-
tory administrative remedies have been exhausted. There seems to be
no doubt that so long as the petitioner has the right to eventual judi-
cial determination of his cause, his right to habeas corpus may be sub-
stantially abridged.47
42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
43. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
44. 159 Wash. 335, 293 Pac. 986 (1930).
45. Id. at 342-44, 293 Pac. at 989.
46. State ex Tel. Thompson v. Clfford, 106 Wash. 16, 179 Pac. 90. (1919).
47. See, e.g., Hodison v. Rogers, 137 Kan. 950, 22 P.2d 491 (1933); Ex parto
Ostatter, 103 Kan. 487, 175 Pac. 377 (1918) ; In re Ingram 82 So. 2d 788 (La. App.
1955).
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Under federal law habeas corpus will not be considered if the peti-
tioner has failed to apply to or has been denied relief by the commit-
ting court, unless it is clear that the statutory remedy is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legitimacy of his confinement.48 In Martin
v. United States"9 the court supported this position, stating:
The desirability of such procedure is apparent. The sentencing
court is familiar with the case. The court in the district of con-
finement is unfamiliar with cases in which sentences have been
imposed by other courts. The production of files, records, and
witnesses is more convenient in the sentencing court. The court
which heard the case and gave judgment thereon should have the
opportunity and responsibility of hearing and determining at-
tacks against the judgment5 °
Mr. Justice Vinson stated additional justification for the Federal
rule in United States v. Hayman,5" stating:
[T]he few District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction the
major federal penal institutions are located were required to
handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.., because
of the fortuitous concentration of federal prisoners within the
district.5 2
For the impelling reasons herein presented, a model release statute
must include an exclusive procedure, one that permits release only
after review and approval by the committing court. Moreover, in
order to remove the unjustifiable burden placed upon those district
or circuit courts located in the same county as the mental institution,
recourse to the writ of habeas corpus should be withdrawn.
THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROVISION AS A SUGGESTED STATUTE
The Model Penal Code Section 4.0853 is carefully drafted and gives
adequate coverage to each of the release recommendations considered
in this note. The following pertinent sections illustrate the Code's
comprehensiveness:
(1) When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental
disease or defect excluding responsibility, the Court shall order
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948), states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply-for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
49. 273 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1960).
50. Id. at 777.
51. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
52. Id. at 213-14.
53. Tent. Draft No. 4 (1955).
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him to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Cor-
rection [Mental Hygiene or Public Health] to be placed in an ap-
propriate institution for custody, care and treatment.(2) If the Commissioner of Correction [Mental Hygiene or
Public Health] is of the view that a person committed to his cus-
tody, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this section, may be dis-
charged or released on probation without danger to himself or to
others, he shall make application for the discharge or release of
such person in a report to the Court by which such person was
committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and re-
port to the district attorney of the county [parish] from which
the defendant was committed. The Court shall thereupon ap-
point at least two qualified psychiatrists to examine such person
and to report within sixty days, or such longer period as the
Court determines to be necessary for the purpose, their opinion
as to his mental condition. To facilitate such examination and
the proceedings thereon, the Court may cause such person to be
confined in any institution located near the place where the Court
sits, which may hereafter be designated by the Commissioner of
Correction [Mental Hygiene or Pubilc Health] as suitable for the
temporary detention of irresponsible persons.(3) If the Court is satisfied by the report filed pursuant to par-
agraph (2) of this section and the testimony of the psychiatrists
making such report, if the Court deems it advisable to hear their
testimony, that the committed person may be discharged or
released on probation without danger to himself or others, the
Court shall order his discharge or his release upon probation,
on such conditions as the Court determines to be necessary. If
the Court is not so satisfied, it shall promptly order a hearing to
determine whether such person may safely be discharged or re-
leased. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding and
the burden shall be upon the committed person to prove that he
may safely be discharged or released. According to the determi-
nation of the Court upon the hearing, the committed person shall
thereupon be discharged or released on probation on such condi-
tions as the Court determines to be necessary, or shall be recom-
mitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction [Mental
Hygiene or Public Health], subject to discharge or release only
in accordance with the procedure above for the first hearing....(5) A committed person may make application for his dis-
charge or release to the Court by which he was committed, and
the procedure to be followed upon such application shall be the
same as that prescribed above in the case of an application by
the Commissioner of Correction [Mental Hygiene or Public
Health]. However, no such application by a committed person
need be considered until he has been confined for a period of not
less than six months from the date of the order of commitment,
and if the determination of the Court be adverse to the applica-
tion, such person shall not be permitted to file a further applica-
tion until one year has elapsed from the date of any preceding
hearing on an application for his release or discharge54
54. Ibid.
Washington University Open Scholarship
CRIMINALLY INSANE 133
From this excerpt it is manifest that the recommendations of this
note parallel the proposed provision, with the exception that the
latter does not deny the right to habeas corpus. The comments to the
Model Penal Code section indicate that the procedure is not exclusive
of habeas corpus, and in this respect the Code should be changed to
conform to the conclusions of this note 5 The adoption of this con-
struction in conjunction with the express provisions of the Code
approaches the ideal procedure necessary to rational and constitu-
tional treatment of patients excused from the consequences of an
otherwise criminal offense by reason of insanity.
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 408, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). "The
proposed provision retains in the committing Court the exclusive power to dis-
charge or release (leaving aside habeas corpus)." (Emphasis added.)
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